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When Salespeople Manage Customer Relationships: 




At many firms, incentivized salespeople with private information about customers are 
responsible for CRM. While incentives motivate sales performance, private information can 
induce moral hazard by salespeople to gain compensation at the expense of the firm. We 
investigate the sales performance--moral hazard tradeoff in response to multidimensional 
performance (acquisition and maintenance) incentives in the presence of private information. 
Using unique panel data on customer loan acquisition and repayments linked to salespeople from 
a microfinance bank, we detect evidence of salesperson private information. Acquisition 
incentives induce salesperson moral hazard leading to adverse customer selection, but 
maintenance incentives moderate it as salespeople recognize the negative effects of acquiring 
low quality customers on future payoffs. Critically, without the moderating effect of maintenance 
incentives, adverse selection effect of acquisition incentives overwhelms the sales enhancing 
effects, clarifying the importance of multidimensional incentives for CRM. Reducing private 
information (through job transfers) hurts customer maintenance, but has greater impact on 
productivity by moderating adverse selection at acquisition. The paper also contributes to the 
recent literature on detecting and disentangling customer adverse selection and customer moral 
hazard (defaults) with a new identification strategy that exploits the time varying effects of 
salesperson incentives. 
 




Firms increasingly recognize the value of customer relationship management (CRM) in that 
although acquiring customers is important, maintaining customer relationships—and ongoing 
revenue streams through higher customer lifetime value— is even more critical for a firm’s 
overall profitability (Jain and Singh 2002, Shin and Sudhir 2010, Venkatesan and Kumar 2004). 
The academic literature on CRM has typically focused on settings where salaried marketers 
balance customer acquisition and maintenance goals using customer databases (e.g., Li, Sun and 
Montgomery 2011, Gupta and Lehmann 2005, Zhang, Netzer and Ansari 2014), but have 
generally ignored the common setting where firms use incentivized salespeople to acquire 
customers and maintain customer relationships.1  
There are two major issues when incentivizing salespeople in CRM settings that have not 
been addressed in the sales incentives literature. First, we consider the need for multidimensional 
performance based incentives that balances sales from both new customer acquisition and 
existing customer retention and maintenance. But typical compensation plans that have been 
studied in the literature (e.g., Chung, Steenburgh and Sudhir 2014; Misra and Nair 2011) are 
only based on a unidimensional measure of performance such as total revenues, which do not 
decompose revenues arising from new customers as opposed to maintenance of existing 
customers--the core of CRM concepts of customer acquisition and retention.2 Second, 
salespeople can have private information on customers, beyond publicly available information 
that is also known to the firm, through their relationships with customers. The private 
information can help the firm aid in improving customer acquisition and maintenance efficiency, 
but it may also be potentially used by salespeople to engage in moral hazard that improves their 
own compensation at the expense of the firm. 
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Our goal is to investigate the sales performance--moral hazard tradeoff among salespeople 
in the use of managerial levers related to multidimensional incentives and private information 
when salespeople manage customer relationships. First, the multi-dimensional incentive scheme 
rewards salespeople based on joint performance on the acquisition and maintenance dimensions. 
While acquisition metrics motivate salespeople to bring in sales through new customers, it also 
incentivizes them to commit moral hazard by selectively bringing in easier-to-acquire, poorer-
quality customers with lower lifetime value. Firms can align salesperson acquisition behavior 
and address the moral hazard issue by appropriately weighting performance by customer quality 
if quality is observable to the firm (e.g., credit rating), but it is not feasible to do this with private 
information. Hence private information can hurt the firm through customer adverse selection.3 
Maintenance metrics incentivize salespeople to strengthen and maintain relationships to generate 
sales from previously acquired customers (e.g., through ongoing purchases/subscriptions, loan 
repayments etc.). But beyond this direct effect, it can also moderate the moral hazard by 
indirectly incentivizing forward looking salespeople to ex-ante not acquire bad customers, who 
are more difficult to retain (and therefore have lower CLV). By giving salespeople a stake in 
future cash flows from customers, maintenance incentives align firm and salesperson payoffs 
over the long-term, thus ameliorating the potential customer adverse selection motivation arising 
from acquisition incentives. 
While the effects of acquisition and maintenance metrics in isolation are intuitive from 
the discussion above, their joint effects are harder to characterize. To help fix ideas, we develop 
a stylized analytical model of salesperson behavior in response to joint acquisition and 
maintenance incentives when they have private information about customers. Two key results 
arise. First, we find that given private information, salespeople engage in advantageous customer 
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selection when there is high maintenance pressure (i.e. the prospect of existing customers 
bringing low profit in the future), and adverse customer selection when maintenance pressure is 
low. The result is insightful in that theoretically, maintenance incentives can not only ameliorate 
adverse selection, but even reverse it to obtain advantageous selection. What happens in practice 
is an empirical question. Second, and not surprisingly, customer maintenance performance 
always improves as maintenance pressure increases independent of acquisition incentives.  
Second, we consider a lever that a firm can use to control the level of private information 
resident in salespeople, given the potential adverse selection effects of private information. One 
relevant lever in sales management that helps control the level of private information is periodic 
job transfers, that break customer-salesperson ties by relocating the salesperson to a new location 
with new customers.4 While this can help the firm by reducing the cost due to adverse selection, 
it can also hurt the sales and maintenance efficiency gains from private information. Which of 
these effects dominate when there is a transfer is an empirical question.5 
The above discussion on how private information and multidimensional incentives 
interact to produce a sales performance-moral hazard tradeoff makes it clear that the effect of 
multidimensional incentives and private information on customer selection, maintenance and 
overall productivity in CRM settings need empirical investigation.  Accordingly, the paper 
addresses the following research questions relevant to salesforce management in CRM settings: 
(1) Do salespeople have private customer information? (2) Do acquisition incentives impact 
acquired customers’ unobservable quality, and if so do they lead to advantageous or adverse 
customer selection? (3) Do maintenance incentives improve customer maintenance and how does 
it impact customer selection? (4) Do transfers that reduce private information improve or hurt the 
quality of customer selection and do they hurt or help customer maintenance? (5) Finally, what is 
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the net effect of acquisition/maintenance incentives and transfers on overall productivity given 
the complex tradeoffs in terms of acquisition and maintenance efficiency, and selection effects?  
Answering these questions poses a number of challenges. First, one needs matched panel 
data on salesforce incentives/performance and customer relationships over time. This is typically 
difficult to obtain, as such data tend to reside separately within different functions of a firm. 
Specifically, the sales incentive and performance data reside within human resource/sales 
functions within a firm, whereas detailed customer panel data reside within the marketing 
function. We use unique panel-data from a microfinance bank in Mexico that lends to small 
business customers and allowed us to match the panel data on performance/ compensation/ 
transfer information about their loan officers (salespeople) with the loan acquisition and 
repayment behavior of their customers. 
Second, detecting private information is challenging due to its intrinsic unobservability. Our 
primary identification strategy leverages the idea that, conditional on public information, 
salesforce performance metrics under the incentive scheme should not directly affect future 
consumer repayment behavior and profitability of new customers, but only indirectly through 
salespeople’s efforts as customers do not observe the metrics. Empirically, we test if there is a 
systematic relationship between the salesperson’s performance metrics, based on which the 
compensation is paid out, and the IRR of the acquired loans conditional on credit rating, loan 
characteristics, and various unobserved demand shifters.  
Moreover, our empirical setting allows for exogenous variation in the level of private 
information, because the bank randomly transferred their salespeople, severing past relationships 
and private information about their customers. The policy is well-designed to be random and 
unpredictable so that salespeople cannot indulge in strategic behavior just prior to transfers.6 The 
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transfer policy allows us to understand how incentives interact with private information in 
producing customer acquisition, maintenance and overall productivity outcomes by comparing 
the salespeople’s acquisition and maintenance behavior before and after the transfer.  
We find that salespeople possess private information about customers and engage in moral 
hazard by using it to maximize their payoffs at the expense of the firm. The key takeaways from 
our findings are as follows: First, multidimensional incentives are critical to overwhelm the 
negative effects of moral hazard and obtain sales productivity gains in CRM settings. 
Salespeople “abuse” private information to acquire lower-quality customers conditional on 
observables to perform well on the acquisition metric, but the customer maintenance metric not 
only reduces loan defaults (better maintenance), but also indirectly moderates the adverse 
selection as forward looking salespeople anticipate the future consequences of current customer 
acquisition. It turns out that the overall impact on productivity from acquisition performance 
would not be positive without the joint use of maintenance incentives. Second, private 
information has positive efficiency enhancing effects, but the negative moral hazard effects on 
productivity are larger. When firms reduce private information and salesperson-customer 
relational capital using transfers,7 the gain from a reduction in adverse selection is greater than 
the loss due to an increase in loan defaults as the relationships between the salesperson and 
borrowers is severed. Hence the periodic destruction of private information through transfers is a 
useful managerial lever in this setting. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We introduce how this paper is related to 
previous literature. Next, we describe institutional details and data. Third, we propose a stylized 
analytical model to formalize the idea. Fourth, we explain our empirical strategy and results and 
discusses the key findings. Lastly, we conclude and provide future research direction. 
7 
 
RELATIONSHIP TO THE LITERATURE 
This paper contributes to multiple literatures in marketing and economics. As discussed in 
the introduction, the CRM literature has not addressed organizational issues of implementing 
CRM through an incentivized salesforce, and this paper addresses that important omission, given 
the ubiquity of sales force driven CRM across many industries.8 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 Our primary contribution is to the empirical literature on salesforce compensation, which 
we summarize based on the four columns Table 1. First, the existing empirical salesforce 
compensation literature (e.g., Chung, Steenburgh and Sudhir 2014; Misra and Nair 2011) either 
focuses on the situation where one-shot transactions generate sales or ignore the distinction 
between sales arising from new customers and those with existing relationships. This paper adds 
to the literature by examining the important case where ongoing customer relationships matter 
and therefore important to distinguish between sales from new customers versus sales from 
existing customers with whom there is already a relationship. Second, existing empirical 
salesforce compensation papers study unidimensional performance metrics. Although there have 
been a large number of empirical papers in the field of education and health on the multitasking 
agency problem (e.g., Feng Lu 2012, Neal and Schanzenbach 2010) since the seminal theoretical 
paper by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991), to the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first 
empirical paper on salesforce compensation that studies a multidimensional compensation 
scheme.  
Third, our paper introduces the issue of private information of salespeople as a source of 
salesperson moral hazard. Existing empirical papers consider salesperson moral hazard around 
the issue of sales or effort timing problems in response to nonlinear incentive plans involving 
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bonuses and targets at periodic intervals. In contrast, we focus on salesperson moral hazard 
arising from the existence of private information on customers, which can lead to adverse 
customer selection in customer acquisition and/or delinquency due to inability to collect from 
those with whom there is strong relationship. In particular, our analytical model introduces a 
stylized framework that helps clarify the joint impact of acquisition and maintenance metrics on 
outcomes when there is private information. A key insight is that maintenance metrics can not 
only ameliorate adverse selection, but also lead to advantageous selection.  
Fourth, our paper considers potential misalignments between a firm and its salesforce 
incentives in terms of information that is unobservable to the firm. In Larkin (2014), 
misalignment between the firm and its salespeople arises because the firm’s performance metric 
does not take into account profit margins even though the firm can observe them, and 
salespeople offer excessive price discounts. In Copeland and Monnet (2008), potential 
misalignment between the firm and its workers is eliminated because the firm’s performance 
metric weighs more the performance on difficult jobs. In these papers, at least conceptually, it is 
possible to address misalignment due to differences in true productivity based on observables by 
appropriately reweighting contemporaneous variables without concerns for intertemporal effects. 
In our paper, the firm faces a misalignment issue due to unobservable (or non-contractible) 
information and the nature of the misalignment is intertemporal. The maintenance incentive 
addresses the intertemporal misalignment by providing an ongoing stake in future cash flows 
from the “customer asset” through an effective “partial ownership” (Grossman and Hart 1986).  
Our paper is also related to the literature on social capital in organizations (Sorenson and 
Rogan, 2014). As noted earlier, the private information residing within salespeople is a form of 
social relationship capital between the firm and its customers—an intangible asset whose 
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ownership i.e., control and residual rights resides not with the firm, but with the salesperson 
(Grossman and Hart 1986). Recently, Shi et al. (2017) investigate the effect of sales 
representative departures on sales in a B2B setting and find that customer reassignment to 
different types of salespeople lead to customer churn with 13.2%-17.6% losses in annual sales 
for the firm, but this paper does not consider potential adverse selection effects. Canales and 
Greenberg (2015) show that these losses may be mitigated by replacing a sales representative 
with another who is stylistically similar in their interactions. These papers suggest that the 
salesperson-customer relationship is valuable to the firm for customer maintenance. Our paper 
shows that while this intangible asset (i.e., private ties that constitute relational contracts) is 
useful to firm in retaining and maintaining customers, its impact through salesperson moral 
hazard in customer acquisition can be high enough that its periodic destruction through transfers 
is profitable to the firm (Fisman, Paravisini and Vig 2011; Canales and Greenberg 2015).  
Methodologically, this study contributes to a growing literature that empirically tests for the 
existence of private information and distinguishes the effects of customer adverse selection and 
customer moral hazard in insurance and credit markets. Note than in our empirical setting, loan 
defaults is a form of customer moral hazard. Identifying the existence of private information and 
quantifying its effect are challenging because of its intrinsic unobservability. Chiappori and 
Salanie (2000) initiated the literature and propose a positive correlation test to detect existence of 
asymmetric information in the car insurance market. Subsequent studies test for asymmetric 
information in health insurance, by obtaining access to additional information such as pre-
existing conditions that cannot be lawfully used by insurance companies (Finkelstein and 
McGarry 2006, Finkelstein and Poterba 2004) to see if this information explains the type of 
insurance plans chosen by the individual and the ex-post health care consumption. The key issue 
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is that researchers cannot disentangle whether the poor outcomes arise from ex-ante adverse 
selection or ex-post moral hazard by only observing ex-post customer behaviors.9 Past studies 
address the issue through a randomized controlled experiment with contract terms (Karlan and 
Zinman 2009) or by exploiting policy changes (Dobbie and Skiba 2013). In a contemporaneous 
paper, Jeziorski et al. (2016) use the specific institutional rules of the Portuguese auto insurance 
market to address adverse selection and moral hazard. Our paper introduces a new identification 
strategy that exploits “supply-side” variation in the salespeople’s motivation to use private 
information at the point of customer acquisition and a policy that explicitly changes the level of 
private information about customers to separate customer adverse selection and customer moral 
hazard.  
INSTITUTIONAL DETAILS AND DATA 
	 In this section, we describe the institutional details of our empirical setting and then explain 
the data used in our empirical analysis. 
Institutional Details 
Our empirical application is in the context of a Microfinance Institution (MFI) in Mexico 
that provides collateral-free loans to low income, small business entrepreneurs through loan 
officers (salespeople). The loans are characterized by their small amount (median of $690), high 
interest rate (median rate is 85%), short maturity (average length is 6 months) and high 
delinquency probability (average of about 25.4%), as is common for microcredit institutions in 
emerging markets (see, e.g., Sengupta and Aubuchon (2008) for more discussion on microcredit 
loans in emerging markets). 
Loan officers have two main responsibilities: acquiring new loans and ensuring repayments 
on existing loans. The acquisition stage involves recruiting borrowers through referrals or 
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personal visits, accepting loan applications, and recommending loan terms to the bank. The bank 
uses public information about the borrower (i.e., a 1-5 credit rating with 5 as best, constructed 
with data from an external agency)10 together with information in the loan application to both 
approve the loan and set the interest rate. Since a salesperson has a lot of discretion to approve a 
loan in our setting, she does not need to have a borrower take further actions if she wants to 
accept the loan. After acquisition, officers must ensure that loans are repaid on time (e.g., 
through phone calls and in-person visits).  Throughout a loan’s life, loan officers can create 
relational capital with their clients and use it to obtain private information about their motives, 
needs, financial capabilities/liabilities, and behavior. Salespeople can use such private 
information in loan decisions on top of observable variables (e.g., credit rating), because 
observables alone may not be sufficient to evaluate borrowers.11 Our interest lies in how loan 
officers use this private information to enhance their personal income—either through increased 
efficiency in customer acquisition and maintenance that also benefits the firm or through adverse 
customer selection, which hurts the firm.12 
The salesperson’s compensation in the bank we study has two parts: salary and bonus. The 
salary is solely determined by seniority, not performance, while the bonus is a function of 
performance on both acquisition and customer maintenance. Acquisition performance is 
benchmarked against one’s own past performance to create an acquisition index (Ajt for officer j 
at period t is defined by 𝐴!" =
!!"
!!"
! , where 𝑁!" is the amount of new loans acquired by office j at 
period t, and 𝑄!"!  is the acquisition quota, or the amount of active loans at period t). Maintenance 
performance is based on the number and value of loans collected relative to the loans outstanding 
as a maintenance index (𝑀!" =
!!"
!"!"
 where 𝑅!" is the outstanding value of loans that are in good 
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standing, and 𝐿𝑉!"is the outstanding value of loans in salesperson j’s portfolio due at period t. 
Hence 𝐷!" = 1−𝑀!" is the fraction of the value of loans outstanding that is delinquent. The final 
bonus is the product of the base salary, acquisition index, and maintenance index (i.e., Bonusjt = 
Salaryjt×Ajt×Mjt); thus, receiving zero points in any category would earn them no bonus at all. 
Note that the multiplicative feature of the incentive scheme leads officers to balance effort 
between acquisition and maintenance in any given time period and introduces a dynamic trade-
off for the salesperson: between the immediate benefits of acquiring (possibly lower quality) 
customers to improve acquisition performance, and its future negative effect on maintenance 
performance. 
Finally, the bank periodically relocates loan officers from their current branch to another 
branch. Such transfers are common in the retail banking sector to avoid the potential abuse of 
private information by loan officers, which could lead to adverse selection (e.g., Fisman, 
Paravisini and Vig 2011). Transferred salespeople take over and monitor the loans acquired by 
their predecessors who left the branch. The transferred salesperson’s maintenance bonus does not 
depend on the loans she has collected in the previous branch, but solely depends on repayment 
outcomes of loans she took over after transfer. A particularly interesting characteristic of the 
transfer policy at the MFI is that the transfers, both in terms of timing and location, are entirely 
randomly determined. The randomness in timing is intended to prevent loan officers from 
engaging in greater adverse selection, when their expectations of transfer are high.13 In the next 
subsection, we show that the transfers are indeed randomly determined. It allows us to treat 




Our panel data include monthly salesforce performance and compensation data matched 
with the transactions on loans generated and maintained by the salespeople. We observe 461 loan 
officers working on 129,839 loans for 14 months from January 2009 to February 2010. The loan 
data include information on loan characteristics such as the borrower’s credit rating, loan terms 
(e.g., amount, interest, origination date and loan duration) and details of loan repayment (e.g., 
monthly payments, delinquency). We do not observe rejected loans, but our empirical analysis 
does not rely on such information. Each loan can be matched with the loan officer who 
originated the loan, and with the loan officer who is currently maintaining the loan (which is 
typically the originating officer, except when there is a transfer). For each loan officer, we have 
monthly information on the branch they were assigned to (from which we can infer transfers), 
and their score on the acquisition and maintenance benchmarks, which determined their bonus. 
 [Insert Tables 2a and 2b here] 
Table 2a reports summary statistics of loan characteristics and bonus points. The average 
loan size is 9,192 pesos (approximately 690 US$ in 2009), with an average loan term of 6 
months. The average (annual) interest rate is high at 87% as is typical in many emerging markets 
without collateral. The high interest rate reflects both a high overall delinquency rate of 
approximately 25.4% and high cost of acquiring and collecting loans. 
The average of monthly acquisition points (A) is 0.75 and maintenance points (M) is 0.85; 
the average of the overall bonus multiplier (A*M) is 0.59 of the salary. Although we have 
significant missing values for the salary information, the average base salary is 4,050 Mexican 
pesos ($313 USD). Lastly, the average number of transfers is 0.37, with a maximum of three 
transfers over the 14 months we observe.  
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Next, we report on the relationship between the bank’s credit rating of borrowers and loan 
performance. Recall that the bank’s five-point rating of borrowers (1 least creditworthy to 5 most 
creditworthy) is determined by the central office and shared with the loan officers who place the 
loan and the loan underwriters who approve the terms of the loan. We confirmed that the 
delinquency probability falls and Internal Rate of Return (IRR) of a loan improves as the credit 
rating goes up, which indicates that the credit rating is a reliable predictor of borrower quality 
and the loan’s risk and performance. Details on how we calculate the IRR can be found in the 
Appendix.   
Table 2b further explores the relationship between credit rating and loan characteristics. 
71% of the loans are given to those with credit rating of 5, 18% to those with credit rating of 4. 
Only 11% of loans are given to those with credit ratings of 3 and below. The interest rates are 
roughly the same across credit ratings, though the standard deviations are high. This is because 
the bank sets interest rates according to a policy where all first-time clients start at the highest 
rate, which is gradually lowered if clients maintain a good credit history. In contrast, duration of 
the loan is greater for those with lower credit rating, which may be the bank’s attempt to make it 
feasible for borrowers with lower incomes to help pay back the loan. 
During the observation window, 33.4% of officers had a transfer, and 3.2% had transfers 
more than once. To assess the randomness of the transfer policy, we report the results of logistic 
regression with transfer as a dependent variable, and observable officer characteristics as 
explanatory variables in Table 3. Transfer is not related to any of the officers’ characteristics, 
such as tenure, the number of months since their previous transfer, gender, or previous period 
performance, confirming the firm’s description of the implementation of the transfer policy. 
Transfer is also not correlated with officers’ past performances up to 3 months before transfer, or 
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other officer characteristics, such as education level, marital status, relationship type (Canales 
2013; Canales and Greenberg 2015) or position in the firm.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
ANALYTICAL MODEL 
We propose a stylized analytical model of salesperson behavior in response to acquisition 
and maintenance incentives as a function of current loan defaults in a salesperson’s portfolio. 
The analytical model aims at setting formal structure to clarify the intuition underlying the verbal 
arguments laid out in the introduction and then understand the joint effects of acquisition and 
maintenance performance metrics on salesperson behavior. Given our focus on salesperson 
private information in the empirical analysis, the analytical model abstracts away observables 
about borrower quality (e.g., credit scores) and loan heterogeneity (e.g., loan amounts, duration), 
that are visible to both the firm and salesperson. Note that abstraction of these factors in the 
analytical model is equivalent to controlling for these factors in the empirical analysis (which we 
will do).  
Customer Primitives 
Prospective customers arrive periodically with requests for loans to a salesperson. The 
salesperson decides whether to offer a loan or not to each prospective customer given her 
incentive payoff and effort cost. There are two types of borrowers; a high type H who has a 
higher loan repayment probability (𝑝!) relative to the low type (𝑝!), i.e., 0 ≤ 𝑝! < 𝑝!.  Further, 
we assume that loan delinquency is an absorbing state; i.e., a low type loan once delinquent is 
never repaid, i.e., 𝑝! = 0. To reflect the idea that it is easier for salespeople to acquire low type 
customers,14  we assume the arrival rate of low type customers 𝜆! is greater than that of the high 
type, i.e., 0 < 𝜆! < 𝜆!. We normalize without loss of generality that 𝜆! = 1.  
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Salesperson Payoffs: Incentives and costs 
The salesperson faces a multidimensional incentive based on acquisition and maintenance 
performance. Let B be the bonus, S the salary, A and M are the acquisition and maintenance 
metrics of performance. Consistent with our empirical setting, we use the following bonus 
function: 𝐵 = 𝑆 ∗ 𝐴 ∗𝑀, where A is the number of loans acquired during the period, relative to 
one’s quota for number of loans (Q), and M is the fraction of the loan portfolio that is not 
delinquent. Without loss of generality, we normalize S and Q to 1.15  
Next we describe the cost of effort for acquisition and maintenance for the salesperson. To 
reflect the idea that greater effort is required to acquire a scarcer, higher value customer, we 
assume that the effort required for acquiring a customer of certain type is inversely proportional 





respectively. Therefore if a salesperson acquires 𝑛! high and 𝑛! low type customers, the 
acquisition effort is given by 𝑒! =
!!
!!
+𝑛𝐿𝜆𝐿. Let 𝑒! = 𝑚𝑝 be the maintenance effort of a 
salesperson to obtain repayment probability of p from the low type that is not delinquent. Note 
that given the customer primitives above, maintenance effort cannot affect the probability of 
repayment of either the high type or the low type that is delinquent. The cost of effort in any 




A key characteristic of the bonus scheme is that the maintenance metric (fraction of 
delinquent loans in salesperson’s loan portfolio) induces inter-temporal forward-looking 
behavior by salespeople who anticipate how the mix of customers they acquire and the 
maintenance effort they incur to avoid delinquency in the present will affect their future 
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compensation through its impact on the future delinquency rate. A complete characterization of 
the salesperson’s acquisition and maintenance effort choices therefore requires solving a 
dynamic program, where the loan portfolio and default rate jointly evolve as a function of the 
mix of high and low type loans and the effort choices of the salesperson. Characterizing the 
analytic solution to such a dynamic program is non-trivial.  
However, our goal of this analysis is more modest; to simply hypothesize whether 
acquisition and maintenance efforts are increasing or decreasing as a function of the value of the 
maintenance metric at the beginning of the period, i.e., share of delinquent loans in the loan 
portfolio. Our analytical strategy is therefore to solve for the salesperson choices for any 
arbitrary future continuation values of different loan types for the salesperson, such that their 
relative values satisfy constraints that are guaranteed to hold. Specifically let 𝑉!,𝑉! and 𝑉!denote 
arbitrary continuation values of salesperson payoff for a high type, low type and delinquent loan 
respectively. Given 1 = 𝑝! > 𝑝! > 𝑝! = 0, the order constraints 𝑉! > 𝑉! > 𝑉! will hold. As a 
normalization, we further assume 𝑉! = 0. 
Salesperson acquisition and maintenance choices 
We now solve for salesperson choices in a period, conditional on the state of her portfolio at 
the beginning of the period. We characterize the portfolio in terms of its number of high, low and 
delinquent loans. Let h and d be the fraction of high type and delinquent loans respectively and 
let k be the total number of loans in the portfolio. Therefore the number of high, delinquent and 
low-non delinquent loans in the portfolio are kh, kd, and 𝑘(1− ℎ − 𝑑) and  respectively. Recall 
that high types do not become delinquent (i.e., 𝑝! = 1), therefore all delinquencies occur from 
the low type.  
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As the firm does not observe loan types, but only the level of delinquents, maintenance 
incentives are only a function of loans that are delinquent (d). But the salesperson with private 
customer information can identify the borrower’s type and acquire or maintain loans 
differentially by type. Given all borrowers are otherwise identical, a salesperson’s choice in the 
acquisition stage is what fraction of arriving prospective borrowers to accept by borrower type. 
We denote the fraction as 𝛼! for high type and 𝛼! for low types. Given the rates of arrival, the 
number of borrowers accepted is 𝜆!𝛼! high types and 𝛼! low types. In the maintenance stage, a 
salesperson with private information will only monitor low types who are not delinquent as high 
types always repay and delinquent loans never repay. For a monitoring intensity of 𝑝, as 
described earlier, the repayment probability of the low type is 𝑝! = 𝑝.    
Now we compute the salesperson’s net current period payoff given bonus and cost of effort. 
The acquisition metric of performance is the number of acquired loans divided by quota 
(normalized to 1) i.e., 𝜆!𝛼! + 𝛼!. The maintenance metric of performance is the fraction of 
loans repaid, i.e., ℎ + (1− ℎ − 𝑑)𝑝. Given the multiplicative bonus scheme, the salesperson 
bonus is (𝜆𝛼! + 𝛼!) ∗ (ℎ + (1− ℎ − 𝑑)𝑝). The effort required to acquire 𝜆!𝛼! + 𝛼!is 𝛼! +
𝛼!. The maintenance effort required to obtain repayment probability p from the low types is 




The salesperson with private information chooses acquisition rates by type (𝛼! ,𝛼!) and 
monitoring level p so as to maximize the sum of the current period payoff and the continuation 
value of payoffs from existing loans:   
𝑈(𝛼! ,𝛼! ,𝑝) = (𝜆!𝛼! + 𝛼!) ∗ (ℎ + (1− ℎ − 𝑑)𝑝)−
𝑐
2 (𝛼! + 𝛼! +𝑚𝑝)
! 
+[(𝜆!𝛼! + 𝑘ℎ)𝑉! + (𝛼! + 𝑘(1− ℎ − 𝑑)𝑝)𝑉!] 
s.t. 0   ≤   𝛼! ,𝛼! ,𝑝   ≤   1 
19 
 
The solution consists of the optimal acquisition rate by type 𝛼!∗  and 𝛼!∗, and monitoring level 𝑝∗. 
We now state the key propositions from our analysis. To help understand the effects of private 
information, we begin with a benchmark result on customer acquisition for the symmetric 
information case, where neither salesperson nor firm has private information. 
Lemma: Customer selection in acquisition without private information: When there is no private 




The ratio of number of low to high types among newly acquired customers !𝐿
∗
𝜆𝛼𝐻
∗ will equal the ratio 
of the arrival rates of the two types 1𝜆 , irrespective of the level of delinquent loans at the 
beginning of the period.  
The lemma is intuitive. Without any private information on types, salespeople accept all 
customers at the same rate, and their relative share is entirely determined by the arrival rates of 
these customers. 
Proposition 1: Customer selection in acquisition with salesperson private information  
(i) As share of delinquents in the salesperson’s loan portfolio (𝑑) at the beginning of the period 




decreases till it reaches zero, at which point, only high types are acquired. 
(ii) There exists a threshold level of share of delinquent loans in the portfolio 𝑑∗, above which 
the ratio of low types to high types among newly acquired customers !!
∗
!!!
∗ is lower than the 






, i.e., there is advantageous selection relative to the symmetric 
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Proof: In Appendix. 
Figure 1 illustrates the proposition with a numerical example for the case of 𝜆 = 0.4, 𝑘 =
0.45, 𝑐 = 0.65,𝑚 = 0.01,𝑉! = 0.25,𝑉! = 1.625, ℎ = 0.6. Figure 1a shows that the share of low types 
decreases and that of high types increases as 𝑑 goes up. In Figure 1b, there is a threshold level of 
𝑑∗at which the share of low to high types crosses the “no private information” share of low to 
high types 1𝜆 , indicating the shift from adverse selection to advantageous selection.  
The proposition states that when salespeople have higher maintenance pressure (higher share 
of delinquent loans in portfolio), they bring fewer easier to acquire “low type” customers. 
Whether private information will lead to adverse selection or advantageous selection will depend 
on a threshold level of 𝑑, below (above) which private information leads to adverse 
(advantageous) selection in acquisition.  
Proposition 2: Ex-post (after acquisition) maintenance effort and loan delinquency 
As the share of delinquent loans 𝑑 in the salesperson’s portfolio increases, their maintenance 




Proof: In Appendix. 
The proposition states that as maintenance pressure in the form of higher share of defaults in 
loan portfolio increases, salespeople increase their monitoring effort p, and reduce the probability 
of loan defaults for the low types 𝑝! . For the same parameters as in the earlier numerical 
example, Figure 1c shows that monitoring effort p increases in d. 




We first discuss the identification strategy and then outline steps of the empirical analysis. 
Identification Strategy 
Given that a salesperson’s private information is inherently unobservable, it is challenging to 
demonstrate its presence or identify its effects on salespeople’s performance outcomes. Our 
identification strategy relies on two ideas (1) that customers do not observe the salesperson’s 
incentive based motivation driving customer acquisition and maintenance efforts and (2) 
transfers exogenously change the level of salesperson’s private information about customers. 
First, if a salesperson has no private information, the profitability of newly acquired loans 
(IRR) should not systematically change with the salesperson’s acquisition performance or 
maintenance pressure at the time of acquisition, after conditioning on observable characteristics 
such as loan terms and macro shocks. Thus any effect of acquisition performance or 
maintenance pressure on customer acquisition helps identify private information.  
Second, the transfer policy creates variation in the level of private information among 
salespeople with transferred people having less private information or relational capital with their 
customers. The randomness in the policy makes this variation exogenous. Therefore, by 
comparing the the IRR of newly acquired loans between transferred and continuing officers, 
controlling for other observables and fixed effects helps identify the effect of private information 
on customer acquisition. Similar comparison of the probability of delinquency of existing loans 
helps identify the effect of private information during the maintenance period. Whether the 
private information leads to advantageous/adverse selection at customer acquisition or 




Our empirical analysis proceeds in three steps. First, we examine selection effects on the 
quality of loans due to managerial levers: acquisition/maintenance incentives, and transfers. This 
allows us to test for both the existence of private information and empirically assess how multi-
dimensional incentives and transfers impact customer selection. Second, we examine ex-post 
repayment/delinquency behavior in response to the managerial levers. Finally, we examine the 
effects of the levers on overall salesperson productivity. We complement our main results with 
robustness checks. All reported specifications are available in the Web Appendix. 
Acquisition: Selection Effects When Originating Loans 
We investigate the selection effects during customer acquisition as a function of (1) 
acquisition performance, (2) maintenance pressure and (3) transfer state of the salesperson at the 
time of origination of the loan (denoted by o). We estimate the following panel linear regression 
model 
(1)            𝐼𝑅𝑅!"# = 𝛼! + 𝛽!𝐴!" + 𝛽!𝐷!,!!! + 𝛾!𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟!" + 𝛾!𝑋! + 𝜇! + 𝜙! + 𝜖!"# 
In equation (1), IRRijo is the internal rate of return of loan i, originated by officer j, at time o. 
IRRijo  measures loan performance realized after the loan cycle. To eliminate the effects of cross-
sectional variation across salespeople and focus on intra-salesperson states, we demean 
acquisition performance (Ajo) by salesperson average across all periods to obtain Ãjo. Similarly 
we demean the fraction of the value of delinquent loans in salesperson j’s portfolio at t (𝐷!") by 
salesperson average across all periods to obtain 𝐷!". As we explained in the analytical model, the 
maintenance pressure in period o is based on the fraction of delinquent loans at the end of the 
previous period o-1, so we include 𝐷!"!!in the regression. The dummy variable Transferjo equals 
1 if officer j was new to the branch at the origination period, which we operationalize as working 
at the branch for less than a month.16  
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The model controls for observable loan characteristics in Xi, such as the borrower’s credit 
rating, loan amount, duration, and interest rate. The model also includes loan officer fixed effects 
to control for unobserved heterogeneity in salespeople, such as risk-aversion, leniency or effect 
of quotas. Lastly, the model has time fixed effects to capture any macro-level shocks, such as 
competition against other banks or macroeconomic shocks. We abstract away from potential 
concerns of endogeneity in the loan terms for now, but revisit this issue in the robustness checks 
section. 
We are primarily interested in coefficients β1, β2 and γ1. The coefficients β1 indicates how 
unobservable loan quality changes with acquisition performance, controlling for all observable 
borrower and loan characteristics. A negative β1 indicates adverse customer selection as the 
salesperson seeks out privately known “bad” customers who are easier to acquire to improve 
acquisition performance.  A positive β2 implies that adverse selection is moderated by the 
maintenance incentive and that officers are forward-looking, i.e., officers under high 
maintenance pressure screen out unprofitable borrowers at o to prevent a higher delinquency risk 
in the future. Lastly, the coefficient γ1 shows the effect of the transfer policy. A positive γ1 shows 
that continuing officers acquire worse loans than transferred officers, suggesting that salespeople 
with little private information (relational capital) engage less in adverse selection. Note that 
transferred and continuing salespeople likely differ in their incentive quotas and information 
levels. γ1 indicates the pure effect of change in the level of information due to a transfer, since we 
control for their incentive states, 𝐴!" and 𝐷!,!!! in the specification. 
[Insert Table 4 here]  
Table 4 reports the results. In Model 1, we find that a one-point increase in acquisition 
performance relative to the loan officer’s average leads to 0.54% decrease in the IRR of new 
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loans. A one-point increase in the maintenance pressure leads to a 1.07% increase in IRR of new 
loans. Transferred officers, whose private information is eliminated, bring in higher-quality loans 
by 2% of IRR. This shows evidence of private information among the salesforce, that higher 
acquisition performance accentuates adverse selection, maintenance pressure mitigates adverse 
selection, and transfers also mitigate adverse selection. We additionally examine loan 
performance measures beyond IRR, such as the number of late repayments and the failure to 
collect a loan on time at least twice during the loan cycle, and found qualitatively similar results. 
Those results are available from the authors upon request. 
Model 2 adds an interaction term between the two incentive states, while Model 3 includes 
quadratic terms for them to capture potential nonlinear effects. The results above remain robust -
all of the specifications support the hypothesis that the marginal quality of the loan suffers due to 
the loan officers’ use of private information to accept riskier borrowers. The coefficients of other 
variables are in the expected direction. As observable credit rating increases, IRR goes up. 
Smaller loan amounts, longer durations, and higher interest rates are associated with lower 
profitability.  
Finally, in an unreported specification, we test if transferred salespeople who do not have 
private information engage in less adverse selection even as they increase their acquisition 
performance. Indeed that interaction effect is positive, supporting the hypothesis. 
Maintenance: Ex-post Loan Repayment 
Next, we investigate how maintenance pressure and transfers impact ex-post repayment 
behavior or delinquency at the maintenance stage.  Loan officers under high maintenance 
pressure are expected to increase monitoring to reduce defaults on repayment. However, 
transferred officers without private information may perform worse on this dimension as they 
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have less information to targeting their maintenance effort, where they are most needed. Hence, 
we run the following regression. 
(2)  𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦!"# = 𝛼! + 𝛽!𝐴!" + 𝛽!𝐷!,!!! + 𝛾!𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟!" 
𝐵𝑎𝑑!"!!(𝛼! + 𝛽!𝐴!" + 𝛽!𝐷!,!!! + 𝛾!𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟!")+ 𝛾!𝑋!" + 𝜇! + 𝜙! + 𝜖!"# 
 Note that the equations (1) and (2) examine salespeople’s behavior at different stages 
(acquisition stage denoted as “o” and maintenance stage is denoted as all subsequent periods 
after acquisition, generically denoted by “t”). In Equation (2), Delinquencyijt is a dummy 
indicating delinquency of loan i, under loan officer j, at time t. A key part of the maintenance 
model in equation (2) is that it separately examines the effects on loans that are already 
delinquent at the end of t-1, which is represented by the indicator 𝐵𝑎𝑑!"!! (i.e. 𝐵𝑎𝑑!"!! = 1) and 
those that are repaid on time in period t-1 (i.e. 𝐵𝑎𝑑!"!! = 0). We do so because a salesperson’s 
monitoring may have greater impact on loans that are not currently delinquent (i.e. 𝐵𝑎𝑑!"!! = 0), 
as we find in the data that delinquent loans tend to remain delinquent irrespective of loan officer 
actions. We then examine the effect of the maintenance pressure and the transfer policy for each 
group of borrowers. The model also controls for loan characteristics through 𝑋!" and officer and 
period fixed effects through 𝜇! and 𝜙!, respectively.  
The main coefficients of interest are those related to maintenance pressure, which primarily 
incentivizes salespeople to ensure repayments on loans. A positive β2  shows that salespeople 
under high maintenance pressure increase monitoring intensity to improve borrowers’ repayment 
behavior at t. A positive γ1 indicates that the removal of private information when the salesperson 
was transferred just prior to period t increases delinquency at t; suggesting that relational capital 
and the private information that results from it does help target efforts on the right borrowers and 
ensure repayment.  
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[Insert Table 5 here] 
The estimates are reported in Table 5. Model 1 has only maintenance pressure at t, Model 2 
has both acquisition and maintenance states, and Model 3 adds the interaction of the two 
components. The coefficient of 𝐷!,!!! is negative and significant in Models 1, 2 and 3, indicating 
that maintenance pressure improves monitoring and reduces delinquency of good loans. 
Specifically, a one-unit increase in maintenance pressure in period t , leads to a 2% decrease in 
the delinquency probability of loans in period t among loans in good standing at t-1. Across 
Models 1-3, the coefficient of Transferjt is consistently positive and significant, indicating that 
the elimination of private information through transfers prevents effective monitoring and hurts 
loan repayment by 0.4%. The negative coefficient of Ãjt in Model 2 indicates that performance on 
acquisitions is complementary to that on maintenance due to the multiplicative form of the 
incentive structure. A large coefficient on Badi,t-1 suggests that loans that are delinquent are more 
likely to remain so. Thus, under high maintenance pressure, officers are less likely to monitor 
such loans and more likely to focus on loans currently in good standing. The positive coefficient 
of 𝐵𝑎𝑑!,!!! ∗ 𝐷!,!!! suggests that currently delinquent loans receive less monitoring and are 
more likely to remain delinquent under high maintenance pressure. We find that transfers have 
little effect on bad loans, because continuing salespeople also do not exert significant effort to 
maintain those borrowers. We confirm that our results are robust to alternative definitions of Bad 
loans.  
In sum, combining the findings from the estimates of equations (1) and (2), we find that 
private information plays different roles in the acquisition and maintenance stages. In the 
acquisition stage, continuing salespeople with private information engage in adverse selection, 
which hurts the firm’s profit, evidenced by the positive 𝛾!in equation (1). However, the negative 
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𝛾! in the equation (2) shows that their information advantage leads to more effective monitoring 
at the maintenance stage, which reduces defaults and increases the firm’s profit.  
Salesperson Productivity: Total Net Present Value of Loans Generated 
Thus far, we have found evidence of salesperson moral hazard that results in customer 
adverse selection due to acquisition incentives. Maintenance incentives mitigate this adverse 
selection, and also improve customer repayment. Transfers which reduce private information 
reduce adverse selection, but also hurt customer repayment. This is a very rich set of empirical 
effects. However, the central question in the use of these levers remains. What is the net effect on 
the incentives and transfers, on overall salesforce productivity?  For this, we examine whether 
the sales-enhancing effect of the incentive levers (e.g., Chung, Steenburgh and Sudhir 2014) 
exceeds the negative adverse selection effect due to private information, and whether the positive 
effect of transfer (decrease in adverse selection) exceeds the negative effect (ineffective 
monitoring). We analyze salesperson productivity at the salespeople-month level rather than at 
the loan-level to allow for sales expansion effects.17 In particular, we run the following model in 
equation (3). 
(3) 𝑁𝑃𝑉!" = 𝛼! + 𝛽!𝐴!" + 𝛽!𝐷!,!!! + 𝛽! 𝐴!" ∗ 𝐷!,!!! + 𝛾!𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟!" 
+𝛾!𝑋! + 𝜇! + 𝜙! + 𝜖!"# 
      The dependent variable NPVjo represents the sum of the net present value of new loans 
acquired by officer j at period o. The coefficients β1, β2 and β3 show the effect of incentive 
components on the overall quality of loans originated by officer j. The coefficient γ1 shows the 
effect of the transfer decision at the point of origination on profits generated by salesperson j. 
[Insert Table 6 here]  
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Table 6 reports the regression results. Model 1 is the baseline case and the estimates show β1 
is positive, β2  positive, and γ1  positive and the effects are all statistically significant. These 
results imply that each of the levers considered contribute positively to firm profits. However we 
need to consider the interaction between the acquisition and maintenance stages to understand 
how these incentives jointly affect profitability. Model 2 adds an interaction term between 
acquisition points and maintenance states, illustrated in Figure 2. When the salesperson is under 
high maintenance pressure (i.e., those whose previous-period maintenance points are 0.5 point 
below their average), the greater acquisition performance leads to a sharp increase in profits, but 
when the maintenance pressure is low (0.5 point above their average), an increase in acquisition 
points leads to very little increase in profits. In the absence of maintenance pressure, salespeople 
engage in significant adverse selection, which neutralizes profits from customer acquisition. In 
effect, the firm is paying out commissions with little gains in profitability. However, officers 
avoid risky acquisitions under high maintenance pressure, which contributes to the firm’s profits. 
This shows that, without the use of maintenance metrics of performance that penalize ex-post 
delinquency, salespeople will resort to significant adverse selection and hurt firm profitability. 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
Managerial Implications 
Our analytical approach and our findings around private information and multidimensional 
incentives have important managerial implications for sales force compensation and 
management. Our simple regression based approach to evaluate how current incentive plans at an 
organization can affect customer acquisition, retention and aggregate salesforce productivity in 
the presence of private information can be widely used. We note that while our application is in a 
setting of multidimensional incentives where the salesforce is responsible for both customer 
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acquisition and retention, the acquisition and productivity regressions can also be used when 
salesforces are only incentivized for acquisition, to measure adverse selection effects and the net 
productivity effects (sales expansion-adverse selection trade-off) of the incentives.  
Next we discuss how our findings provide guidance for salesforce management. First, while 
it is well-appreciated by managers that the sales expanding benefits of acquisition incentives are 
accompanied by moral hazard costs (salespeople can choose actions for private gain at the 
expense of the firm), the conventional wisdom is that the sales expanding benefits should more 
than overwhelm the moral hazard costs. Surprisingly, in our application we find that without the 
disciplining effects of maintenance metrics on salesforce moral hazard, the overall benefits from 
acquisition incentives can be negative because of adverse selection and lack of attention to 
retention. This suggests that the cost of salesforce moral hazard and remedies should be 
evaluated more seriously by sales management in settings even when only acquisition incentives 
are currently offered. In particular, we highlight the role of transfers when feasible as way to 
“kill” private information in order to reduce salesperson moral hazard. While our results justify 
the oft-employed transfer practices in retail banking,18 we note that the net effects of transfers 
will vary across settings. Our approach however provides a general approach for managers to 
study the net effects of transfers in other settings. 
Second, an often-used remedy for firm-salesforce misalignment is to appropriately weigh 
performance metrics to create alignment. For instance, if salespeople discount heavily to win 
sales and improve revenue performance, weighing the revenues by margins can create alignment. 
But weighting may not always be feasible, and our findings suggest that multidimensional 
performance metrics may be the more feasible option to create alignment. For example, in the 
context of CRM it is well-known that retention often matters more than even acquisition for firm 
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value. While weighting acquired customers by CLV is a possibility, it is often infeasible because 
(i) CLV requires forecasts of future retention and revenues, and it may not be feasible to tie 
incentives to forecasts and (ii) it is not possible to hold the salesperson responsible for future 
retention, once payments have been made based on forecasts. Multidimensional incentives where 
incentives balance current acquisition and future maintenance performance are a very effective 
managerial solution in these settings without requiring future forecasts.   
Finally, our findings have implications for job design in CRM settings. Firms implementing 
CRM often use a hunter-farmer model where some salespeople are responsible for customer 
acquisition (hunting), while others are responsible for customer maintenance (farming), to take 
advantage of the benefits of specialization in skills needed for these two types of activities. Our 
results suggest that the gains from specialization may be overwhelmed by the moral hazard at 
customer acquisition due to customer adverse selection. Our results suggest that it may be useful 
to create teams with joint responsibility for acquisition and maintenance, to benefit from the 
gains in specialization,while simultaneously internalizing the potential for moral hazard.  
CONCLUSION  
This paper aims at addressing the challenges of the sales performance-moral hazard trade-
off arising when salespeople manage customer relationships. We consider the role of 
multidimensional incentives that are based on joint acquisition and maintenance metrics and that 
of private information. A stylized analytical model of salesperson behavior in CRM settings 
helps us understand how the acquisition and maintenance jointly impact outcomes when there is 
private information. We then exploit unique matched panel data on customers and salespeople at 
a microfinance organization to empirically analyze how these sales management levers impact 
CRM outcomes. Managerially, our study illustrates how firms managing CRM can assess the 
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effect of their performance metrics and compensation plans on customer acquisition, retention 
and overall productivity. This approach can be used even firms only use acquisition performance 
incentives by estimating only the customer acquisition and productivity regressions. 
Methodologically, the paper also introduces a new identification strategy to detect and 
disentangle customer adverse selection and customer moral hazard that has been a major issue in 
credit and insurance markets, by exploiting time-varying effects of loan officer incentives and 
job transfers. 
We believe this paper is a first step to address a rich set of research issues at the intersection 
of CRM and sales management. We conclude with some suggestions for future research. First, 
we considered a setting involving customer acquisition for loans and ongoing repayment for the 
loan’s life. Insurance settings are similar in that they also involve customer acquisition of 
insurance policies and ongoing premium payments over the life of the policy. But other common 
settings do not have clear maintenance outcomes--for example CRM often involves cross-selling 
of products, increasing the share of a customer’s wallet etc. Further research is needed on how 
firms should incentivize salespeople on such CRM related metrics.  
Second, substantive research on multidimensional incentives is still scarce. While 
multidimensional incentives involve balancing short-run and long-run considerations with 
acquisition and maintenance incentives in our paper, firms may want to align employee 
incentives by weighing competing contemporaneous considerations (e.g., lowering service time 
and increasing satisfaction) in other settings. 
Third, in finance, transfers are commonly used as a means to render the salesperson’s 
relational capital unusable and thus minimize negative effects of adverse selection in customer 
acquisition. However, this can potentially hurt the efficiency gains from the ongoing 
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relationship. Canales and Greenberg (2015) find that much of the potential loss of repayment of 
loans may be averted by replacing salespeople with others who have a similar relational style, 
suggesting that there may be a way to reduce customer adverse selection through transfers, while 
avoiding the increased loan defaults through continuity in salespeople styles. More generally, 
while we find that transfers have a net benefit for the bank, Shi et al. (2017) find in their setting 
that customer reassignment to salespeople (equivalent to transfers) can lead to significant loss 
churn in the context of electrical product retailer. However, Shi et al. does not consider the 
adverse selection issue. Future research may investigate how the relative importance of adverse 
selection vs. efficiency from private information varies across industries and how managers can 
balance them.  
Finally, our results should motivate more research on sales person job design in CRM 
settings. While in bank and insurance settings, salespeople are responsible for both customer 
acquisition and maintenance, many organizations and industries follow a specialized hunter-
farmer model (Palmatier et al. 2007) with different employees responsible for customer 
acquisition (hunt) and customer retention/maintenance (farm). In such cases, we suggest that to 
the extent possible, a CLV weighted metric of performance should be used to incentivize 
hunters, while the farmers be incentivized on maintenance metrics. Alternatively, one may 
construct teams that are responsible for both acquisition and retention, thus gaining both 
specialization benefits while reducing the cost of moral hazard. But more broadly, our research 
suggests that when designing organizations for CRM, we need to balance the efficiency gain 
from specialization in acquisition and maintenance activities, with the potential adverse effects 




Agarwal, Sumit, and Itzhak Ben-David. “Do Loan Officers' Incentives Lead to Lax Lending 
Standards?” mimeo. 2014. 
Canales, Rodrigo. "Weaving straw into gold: Managing organizational tensions between 
standardization and flexibility in microfinance." Organization Science 25, no. 1 (2013): 1-28. 
Canales, Rodrigo, and Jason Greenberg. "A Matter of (Relational) Style: Loan Officer 
Consistency and Exchange Continuity in Microfinance." Management Science 62, no. 4 
(2015): 1202-1224. 
Chevalier, Judith, and Glenn Ellison. "Risk Taking by Mutual Funds as a Response to 
Incentives." Journal of Political Economy 105, no. 6 (1997): 1167-1200. 
Chiappori, Pierre-André, and Bernard Salanie. "Testing for asymmetric information in insurance 
markets." Journal of Political Economy 108.1 (2000): 56-78. 
Chung, Doug J., Thomas Steenburgh, and K. Sudhir. "Do bonuses enhance sales productivity? A 
dynamic structural analysis of bonus-based compensation plans." Marketing Science 33.2 
(2013): 165-187. 
Cole, Shawn, Martin Kanz, and Leora Klapper. "Incentivizing Calculated Risk­‐Taking: 
Evidence from an Experiment with Commercial Bank Loan Officers." The Journal of Finance 
70, no. 2 (2015): 537-575. 
Dobbie, Will, and Paige Marta Skiba. "Information asymmetries in consumer credit markets: 
Evidence from payday lending." American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 5, no. 4 
(2013): 256-282. 
Feng Lu, Susan. "Multitasking, information disclosure, and product quality: Evidence from 
nursing homes." Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 21, no. 3 (2012): 673-705. 
34 
 
Finkelstein, Amy, and Kathleen McGarry. "Multiple dimensions of private information: evidence 
from the long-term care insurance market." American Economic Review 96.4 (2006): 938-
958. 
Finkelstein, Amy, and James Poterba. "Adverse selection in insurance markets: Policyholder 
evidence from the UK annuity market." Journal of Political Economy 112, no. 1 (2004): 183-
208. 
Fisman, Raymond, Daniel Paravisini, and Vikrant Vig. “Social proximity and loan outcomes: 
Evidence from an Indian Bank.” Working Paper, 2011. 
Grossman, Sanford J., and Oliver D. Hart. “The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of 
Vertical and Lateral Integration.” Journal of Political Economy (1986): 691-719.  
Gupta, Sunil, and Donald R. Lehmann. “Managing Customers as Investments: The Strategic 
Value of Customers in The Long Run.” No. s 48. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Wharton School 
Publishing, 2005. 
Heider, Florian, and Roman Inderst. “Loan prospecting.” Review of Financial Studies 25, no. 8 
(2012): 2381-2415. 
Hertzberg, Andrew, Jose Liberti, and Daniel Paravisini. “Information and Incentives Inside The 
Firm: Evidence from Loan Officer Rotation." Journal of Finance 65, no. 3 (2010): 795-828. 
Holmstrom, Bengt, and Paul Milgrom. "Multitask principal-agent analyses: Incentive contracts, 
asset ownership, and job design." Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 7 (1991): 24-
52. 
Jain, Dipak, and Siddhartha S. Singh. “Customer Lifetime Value Research in Marketing: A 
Review and Future Directions.” Journal of Interactive Marketing 16, no. 2 (2002): 34-46. 
35 
 
Jeziorski, Przemyslaw, Elena Krasnokutskaya, and Olivia Ceccarini. "Adverse Selection and 
Moral Hazard in a Dynamic Model of Auto Insurance." (2016). 
Karlan, Dean, and Jonathan Zinman. “Observing Unobservables: Identifying Information 
Asymmetries with a Consumer Credit Field Experiment.” Econometrica 77, no. 6 (2009): 
1993-2008. 
Kishore, Sunil, Raghunath S. Rao, Om Narasimhan, and George John. "Bonuses versus 
commissions: A field study." Journal of Marketing Research 50, no. 3 (2013): 317-333. 
Kumar, V., Sarang Sunder, and Robert P. Leone. “Measuring and Managing a Salesperson's 
Future Value to the Firm.” Journal of Marketing Research 51, no. 5 (2014): 591-608. 
Larkin, Ian. “The Cost of High-powered Incentives: Employee Gaming in Enterprise Software 
Sales.” Journal of Labor Economics 32, no. 2 (2014): 199-227. 
Li, Shibo, Baohong Sun, and Alan L. Montgomery. “Cross-selling the Right Product to the Right 
Customer at the Right Time.” Journal of Marketing Research 48, no. 4 (2011): 683-700. 
Misra, Sanjog, and Harikesh S. Nair. “A Structural Model of Sales-force Compensation 
Dynamics: Estimation and Field implementation.” Quantitative Marketing and Economics 9.3 
(2011): 211-257. 
Neal, Derek, and Diane Whitmore Schanzenbach. "Left behind by design: Proficiency counts 
and test-based accountability." The Review of Economics and Statistics 92, no. 2 (2010): 263-
283. 
Oyer, Paul. "Fiscal year ends and nonlinear incentive contracts: The effect on business 
seasonality." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 113, no. 1 (1998): 149-185. 
36 
 
Palmatier, Robert W., Lisa K. Scheer, and Jan-Benedict EM Steenkamp. "Customer loyalty to 
whom? Managing the benefits and risks of salesperson-owned loyalty." Journal of Marketing 
Research 44, no. 2 (2007): 185-199.  
Reinartz, Werner, Manfred Krafft, and Wayne D. Hoyer. “The Customer Relationship 
Management Process: Its Measurement and Impact on Performance.” Journal of Marketing 
Research, 41, no. 3 (2004): 293-305. 
Sappington, David. “Limited Liability Contracts between Principal and Agent.” Journal of 
Economic Theory 29, no. 1 (1983): 1-21. 
Schöttner, Anja. "Optimal sales force compensation in dynamic settings: commissions vs. 
Bonuses." Management Science 63, no. 5 (2016): 1529-1544. 
Sengupta, Rajdeep, and Craig P. Aubuchon. “The Microfinance Revolution: An Overview.” 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review 90.January/February 2008 (2008). 
Simester, Duncan, and Juanjuan Zhang. “Why Do Salespeople Spend So Much Time Lobbying 
for Low Prices?” Marketing Science 33, no. 6 (2014): 796-808. 
Shi, Huanhuan, Shrihari Sridhar, Rajdeep Grewal, and Gary Lilien. "Sales Representative 
Departures and Customer Reassignment Strategies in Business-to-Business Markets." Journal 
of Marketing 81, no. 2 (2017): 25-44. 
Shin, Jiwoong, and K. Sudhir. "A Customer Management Dilemma: When Is It Profitable to 
Reward One's Own Customers?” Marketing Science 29, no. 4 (2010): 671-689. 
Sorenson, Olav, and Michelle Rogan. "(When) do organizations have social capital?." Annual 
Review of Sociology 40 (2014): 261-280.  
Steenburgh, Thomas J. “Effort or Timing: The Effect of Lump-sum Bonuses.” Quantitative 
Marketing and Economics 6, no. 3 (2008): 235-256. 
37 
 
Venkatesan, Rajkumar, and V. Kumar. “A Customer Lifetime Value Framework for Customer 
Selection and Resource Allocation Strategy.” Journal of Marketing 68, no. 4 (2004): 106-125. 
Zhang, Jonathan Z., Oded Netzer, and Asim Ansari. "Dynamic targeted pricing in B2B 
relationships." Marketing Science 33, no. 3 (2014): 317-337. 
ENDNOTES 
1.  Related papers at the sales management-CRM interface include (1) Kumar, Sunder and Leone 
(2014), who propose a metric to compute salesperson lifetime value based on CLV managed by 
each salesperson, and (2) Palmatier et al. (2007) and Shi et al. (2016) who study the linkages 
between salesperson turnover and customer loyalty. These papers do not address incentive 
issues. 
2.  A natural question is whether one could use aggregate CLV aggregate CLV of a salesperson’s 
acquired customers in a period as unidimensional metric to determine incentives. Two practical 
challenges arise. First, CLV requires forecasting future revenues of customers, but incentive 
contracts based on forecasts is often infeasible. Further, the salesperson has little incentive to 
deliver the forecast CLV by retaining customers after having received the incentive.  
3.  The issue of adverse selection in response to sales incentives has received much media 
attention in in the context of the subprime mortgage crisis. Loan officers in banks were accused 
of approving mortgages to customers with less than stellar credit, by disguising their lack of 
creditworthiness in order to receive loan acquisition bonuses as they were not responsible for 
subsequent performance. Adverse selection is also critical in other marketing settings where 
firms invest substantially in customer acquisition and hope to recover the benefits of their 
investments over the life of the relationship. If a salesperson knowingly acquires customers who 
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are likely to leave soon before the acquisition costs have been recouped, such acquisitions can 
hurt firm value. 
4.  Employee transfer is a common practice in the B2B finance sector. France, Germany, and the 
U.S., for example, mandate rotation of audit partners across clients. See discussion in Fisman, 
Parvasini and Vig (2011) on mandated transfers in the Indian state banking sector. 
5.  Firms typically do not have levers either contractually or through incentives to appropriate 
this asset from the salesperson so that the firm can avoid the adverse selection. For instance, 
although firms encourage salespeople to input information about their ongoing conversations 
with prospects and stage of conversion in CRM tools, salespeople are reluctant to part with this 
information, which they view as their own assets for which they receive no rewards for sharing. 
6.  Hertzberg, Liberti, and Paravisini (2010) find that loan officers are more likely to make 
negative reports on borrowers’ ability to repay, when anticipating transfers. The randomization 
of transfers in our setting excludes the possibility of such strategic behavior by officers. 
7.  We do not distinguish between private information and relational capital. Both are established 
as a salesperson interacts with potential customers and existing customers (borrowers) over time, 
at the time of loan application, screening, monitoring and repayment. Thus we treat transferred 
salespeople as those who lost both private information and relational capital. 
8.  Reinartz, Krafft and Hoyer (2004) consider issues of organizational alignment in 
implementing CRM, but do not consider salesforce incentive issues. 
9.  The relationship between loan officers’ incentives and their screening/monitoring behaviors 
have been studied in finance (Agarwal and Ben-David 2014; Cole, Kanz and Klapper 2015; 
Heider and Inderst 2012; Hertzberg, Liberti and Paravisini 2010). They mention problems with 
unidimensional incentives but do not formally address the balance between multiple tasks. 
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10.  Loan officers cannot change credit ratings, nor do they advise customers about how to 
improve credit ratings. Since a salesperson has significant discretion in approving the loan in our 
setting, she does not need to make a borrower to take further action to recommend the loan. 
11.  Based on interviews, Canales (2013) notes that salespeople do not completely trust 
observables, and tend to act based on private information. We quote from two interviews: (1) 
“You (a loan officer) go through the entire analytic process and, at the end, if you trust the client 
and believe in her, you give her the loan. Maybe the liquidity index will not be enough 
[according to the rules] but if you believe in her, you will “help her out” and you will take the 
risk with her.” and (2) “They (officers) have access to information on each of their clients. They 
can use that information to determine the moral and economic solvency of new prospects, to 
detect when a client is in trouble, and to be more effective when they need to collect. They have 
seen what works and what doesn’t. They know who does what and who knows who. When 
officers use that information to benefit a client, they can make a big difference.” 
12.  Our data allows us to study repayment behavior within a loan, but we lack sufficiently long 
panel data to study customer retention and repayment behavior across loans. Further, 
maintenance incentives are only for repayment. Therefore we only consider repayment within 
the loan as maintenance. 
13.  As salespeople are given less than one week to start work at the new location after a transfer 
it is hard for them to change their behavior or share private information to incoming salespeople. 
14.  This is because observably high type customers have more outside options due to greater 




15.  We check the robustness of our hypotheses for an additive bonus function and find them to 
be qualitatively robust in the Web Appendix. 
16.  We use the one month operationalization for “newness to branch” because: 1) given short 
loan cycles, salespeople seek to elicit as much information as possible in a short time and 2) 
salespeople work for 14-15 hours a day, thus typically get to know their customers within the 
month. Our results are robust to alternative operationalizations of newness.  
17.  The total NPV metric is similar in spirit to the Salesperson Lifetime Value Metric in Kumar, 
Sunder and Leone (2015) at the salesperson-month level, but with ex-post known (as opposed to 
forecast) values of future customer cash flows. 
18.  We note that the effects of transfers can vary by context, by the specifics of the transfer 
policy used, and the nature and use of private information in that context. Like in our paper, Shi 
et al. (2017) show that transfers break the relationship between employees and customers and 
increase customer churn rate, but it is possible that the adverse selection costs of private 
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Table 2a. Summary Statistics 
Loan Characteristics Mean SD Min Max 
Amount (pesos) 9,192 8,956 700 55,000 
Annual Interest rate (%) 87.21 8.81 42 100.29 
Duration (months) 6.27 3.89                                                                                                                                                                                                                            1 33 
Delinquency (%) 25.42    
Salesforce Incentives and Transfer Mean SD Min Max 
By Salesperson-period Acquisition Point (𝐴) 0.75 0.45 0 3.188 Maintenance Point (𝑀) 0.85 0.23 0 1.25 
By Salesperson 𝐴 ∗𝑀 0.59 0.3   
No. of Transfers 0.37 0.55 0 3 
 
Table 2b. Distribution of Loan Performance and Characteristics across Credit Rating 
Credit 
Rating N 
IRR Delinquency prob. Interest rate Duration 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
1 4,484 45.9 44.57 0.65 0.36 88.67 9.83 10.76 6.38 
2 3,089 53.36 39.46 0.59 0.38 86.71 9.58 10.84 6.89 
3 6,754 66.98 35.63 0.46 0.38 88.1 8.46 8.43 4.41 
4 23,768 79.16 23.96 0.25 0.3 86.27 7.25 6.13 3.77 
5 91,744 87.28 19.66 0.14 0.22 87.58 9.13 5.84 3.38 
 
Table 3. Randomness of Transfer Policy1 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
DV 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟! 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟! 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟! 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟! 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟! 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟! 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟! 
𝐴!!! 
-0.251  -0.294    -0.0195 
(0.203)  (0.206)    (1.199) 
𝑀!!! 
 0.342 0.429    -1.771 
 (0.387) (0.406)    (2.916) 
Tenure 
   -0.00199   0.00960 
   (0.00139)   (0.00850) 
Female 
    0.368  1.645 
    (0.241)  (1.047) 
Time since     
Last Transfer 
     0.151 0.357 
     (0.0957) (0.282) 
Intercept 
-2.897*** -3.505*** -3.218*** -2.716*** -3.440*** -4.284*** -6.338* 
(0.304) (0.452) (0.439) (0.152) (0.182) (0.486) (3.493) 
Period FE Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes 
N 2,603 2,646 2,590 3,224 1,947 696 150 




Table 4. Internal Rate of Return (IRR) of Newly Originated Loans 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
DV IRR IRR IRR 
𝐴!"   
-0.537*** -0.540*** -0.645*** 
(0.152) (0.152) (0.159) 
𝐷!,!!! 
1.070** 1.059** 0.970* 
(0.538) (0.538) (0.567) 
𝐴!" ∗ 𝐷!,!!! 
 -0.556  
 (1.382)  
(𝐴!")! 
  -0.556** 
  (0.244) 
(𝐷!,!!!)! 
  1.037 
  (1.851) 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟!" 
1.987*** 1.984*** 1.988*** 
(0.216) (0.216) (0.216) 
Rating 2 3.991*** 3.991*** 3.995*** (0.598) (0.598) (0.598) 
Rating 3 13.33*** 13.33*** 13.33*** (0.476) (0.476) (0.476) 
Rating 4 21.74*** 21.74*** 21.75*** (0.420) (0.420) (0.420) 
Rating 5 26.66*** 26.66*** 26.66*** (0.404) (0.404) (0.404) 
Loan 
Amount 
0.630*** 0.630*** 0.629*** 
(0.0790) (0.0790) (0.0790) 
Duration -0.108*** -0.108*** -0.108*** (0.0202) (0.0202) (0.0202) 
Interest Rate 0.657*** 0.657*** 0.657*** (0.00703) (0.00703) (0.00703) 
Intercept -10.95*** -10.97*** -10.87*** (1.231) (1.232) (1.233) 
Salesperson, 
Period FE Yes Yes Yes 
N 89,993 89,993 89,993 




Table 5. Delinquency of Existing Loans   
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
DV Delay Delay Delay 
𝐷!,!!! 
-0.0201*** -0.0203*** -0.0203*** 
(0.00763) (0.00764) (0.00778) 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟!" 
0.00448* 0.00442* 0.00442* 
(0.00257) (0.00257) (0.00257) 
𝐵𝑎𝑑!,!!! 
0.470*** 0.470*** 0.470*** 
(0.00198) (0.00198) (0.00198) 
𝐵𝑎𝑑!,!!! ∗ 𝐷!,!!! 
0.0954*** 0.0957*** 0.0957*** 
(0.0128) (0.0128) (0.0129) 
𝐵𝑎𝑑!,!!! ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟!" 
-0.00403 -0.00376 -0.00377 
(0.00390) (0.00390) (0.00391) 
𝐴!" 
 -0.00440** -0.00441** 
 (0.00178) (0.00180) 
𝐵𝑎𝑑!,!!! ∗ 𝐴!" 
 0.000994 0.000999 
 (0.00321) (0.00322) 
𝐴!" ∗ 𝐷!,!!! 
  -0.000431 
  (0.0169) 
𝐵𝑎𝑑!,!!! ∗ 𝐴!" ∗ 𝐷!,!!! 
  0.000603 
  (0.0300) 
Rating 2 
-0.00468 -0.00468 -0.00468 
(0.00415) (0.00415) (0.00415) 
Rating 3 
-0.0720*** -0.0720*** -0.0720*** 
(0.00351) (0.00351) (0.00351) 
Rating 4 
-0.165*** -0.165*** -0.165*** 
(0.00314) (0.00315) (0.00315) 
Rating 5 
-0.253*** -0.253*** -0.253*** 
(0.00301) (0.00301) (0.00301) 
Loan Amount 
-0.00482*** -0.00483*** -0.00483*** 
(0.000718) (0.000718) (0.000718) 
Duration 
0.00162*** 0.00163*** 0.00163*** 
(0.000180) (0.000180) (0.000180) 
Interest Rate 
0.00212*** 0.00212*** 0.00212*** 
(0.0000686) (0.0000686) (0.0000686) 
Age of Loan 
0.0113*** 0.0113*** 0.0113*** 
(0.000299) (0.000299) (0.000299) 
Intercept 0.126*** 0.126*** 0.126*** 
45 
 
(0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0112) 
Salesperson, Period FE Yes Yes Yes 
N 278,943 278,943 278,943 





Table 6.  Total NPV of Originated Loans by Salesperson by Month  
 
 Model 1 Model 2 













Intercept 4.957*** 5.058*** (1.885) (1.885) 
Salesperson FE Yes Yes 
Period FE Yes Yes 
N 3,403 3,403 












Figure 1a. Acceptance rate by Type under Private Information  
 
Figure 1b. Relative acceptance rate (Low/High) under Private information vs. No information 
 
Figure 1c. Monitoring Intensity under Private Information 
  












Details on Compensation Plan 
We describe the specifics of how acquisition and maintenance points are calculated for the 
purposes of compensation. Tables A.1 describes how a sales person’s target for a month is set 
based on the portfolio size of the previous month. Acquisition point (A) is the ratio the value of 
newly acquired loans to acquisition target as defined in Table A.1.  Table A.2 describes the 
nonlinear mapping from percentage of loan amount in good standing to maintenance points.  
[Insert Tables A.1 and A.2 here] 
Formal Analytical Model 
We provide the details of the analytical model. We solve for the optimal action for a 
salesperson to maximize the objective function. Only the interior solutions are presented here but 
the corner solutions (0 or 1) are applied under some conditions. 
𝛼!∗ =
1
𝑐(1− ℎ − 𝑑)!(1− 𝜆)! [(1− ℎ − 𝑑)
!(𝑉!𝜆 + 𝑉!(𝑐𝑘(1− 𝜆)− 𝜆))− 𝑐𝑚(ℎ!(1− 𝜆) 
+(𝑐 + 2(1 − 𝑑))𝑉𝐻𝜆 − 𝑐𝑉𝐿 − (1 − 𝑑)(1 + 𝜆)𝑉𝐿 − ℎ(1 − 𝑑 + 𝑐(1 − 𝜆) − 𝜆(1 − 𝑑) + 2𝑉𝐻𝜆 
−𝑉!(1 + 𝜆))) + 𝑐!𝑚!(𝑉!𝜆 − 𝑉! − ℎ(1 − 𝜆))] 
𝛼!∗ =
1
𝑐(1− ℎ − 𝑑)!(1− 𝜆)! [−(1− ℎ − 𝑑)
!(𝑉!𝜆! + 𝑉!(𝑐𝑘(1− 𝜆)− 𝜆!)+ 𝑐𝑚𝜆((1− ℎ
− 𝑑)(𝑉!(1+ 𝜆) 
−ℎ(1− 𝜆)− 2𝑉!)− 𝑐(ℎ(1− 𝜆)− 𝑉!𝜆 + 𝑉!))+ 𝑐!𝑚!(−𝑉!𝜆 + 𝑉! + ℎ(1− 𝜆)) 
𝑝∗ =
𝜆(𝑉! + ℎ) − (𝑉! + ℎ)
(1 − 𝜆)(1 − ℎ − 𝑑)
 








∗ ) < 0 when 𝑑 <
(!!!)!!(!!!!!)
!!!(!!!!!!!!(!!!))(! !(!!!)!!!!(!!!)(!!!)!!(!!!))
!  !  !  !!(!!!)
!    !  (!!!!!!!!!!!(!"(!!!)!!!)!(!!!!"!!!(!!!)))
 
+
(𝑐!𝜆!(1 − 𝜆)!(𝑉! − 𝑉!)
!(ℎ(1 − 𝜆) − 𝑉!𝜆 + 𝑉!)
!(1 −𝑚) + 𝑐!𝑘𝑉!𝑚(1 − 𝜆)




𝑐  ℎ  𝑘  𝑉!(1 − 𝜆)








 (e.g. adverse selection) or 𝛼!∗ < 𝛼!∗ when 
𝑑 <
1
2𝜆(1 − 𝜆)(𝑉! − 𝑉!) + 4𝑐𝑘𝑉!(1 − 𝜆)
[2𝜆(1 − ℎ)(1   +   𝜆)(𝑉! − 𝑉!)+ 𝑐𝑘𝑉𝐿(4  (1 −   ℎ)(1 − 𝜆)
+ (  ℎ  (1   + 𝜆!) 
+(1+ 3  𝜆)𝑉𝐿 − 𝑉𝐻𝜆  (3 +   𝜆))𝑚)+ 𝑐𝑚(𝑚(8(𝑉𝐻𝜆 − 𝑉𝐿 − ℎ(1 − 𝜆))(𝑉𝐻𝜆(1 + 𝜆)    
+𝑉!(2𝑐𝑘(1 − 𝜆) − 𝜆(1 + 𝜆)) + (1 − 𝜆)(𝑉!!𝜆!(1 − 𝜆) + ℎ!(1 − 𝜆)(1 + 𝜆)! − 2𝑉!𝑉!𝜆(1 − 𝜆 − 8𝑐𝑘) 







(e.g. advantageous selection) or 𝛼!∗ > 𝛼!∗ when 𝑑 is greater than the threshold. 





> 0 since 𝜆(𝑉! + ℎ) − (𝑉! + ℎ) > 0 
Table A.1: Compensation Plan – Acquisition Target 
Portfolio Size 01/09 – 06/09 07/09 – 02/10 Portfolio Size 01/09 – 06/09 07/09 – 02/10 
0 – 500,000 50,000 60,000 1,500,001 – 2,000,000 110,000 120,000 
500,001 - 
1,000,000 70,000 80,000 
2,000,000 – 
2,500,000 130,000 140,000 
1,000,001 – 
1,500,000 90,000 100,000 2,500,001 - 150,000 160,000 
 
Table A.2: Compensation Plan – Maintenance Point 
 
 % loan amount in 
good standing Point 
 % loan amount in 
good standing Point 
 % loan amount in 
good standing Point 
0 - 87.5% 0 93 - 93.5% 0.75 96.5 - 97% 1.05 
87.5 - 88.5% 0.5 93.5 - 94% 0.8 97 – 97.5% 1.08 
88.5 - 90% 0.6 94 - 94.5% 0.85 97.5 - 98% 1.1 
90 - 92.5% 0.65 94.5 - 96% 0.9 98  - 99% 1.15 
92.5 -93% 0.7 96 - 96.5% 1 99 - 99.5% 1.2 
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Further evidence on the randomness of transfer policy 
In the main text, we argue that transfer decisions are completely random, verified by 
interviews with the firm and our analysis in Table 3 in the paper. In this section, we additionally 
confirm that the transfer decisions are not correlated with the average loan amount that each 
salesperson gives out, or the interaction between time since the last transfer and previous 
period’s maintenance performance. The result reported in Table WA1 shows that no coefficient 
is significant at the 10% level and verifies the randomness of transfer policy.  
[Insert Table WA1 here] 
Duration of the Effect of Transfer  
In the main text, we assume a salesperson as new to the branch, if he has worked for the 
branch for less than a month. Our assumption stems from the fact that 1) loan cycles are very 
short (i.e. 6 months on average), thus salespeople tend to try to elicit much information about 
customers in a short time and 2) salespeople typically work for 14-15 hours per day, thus might 
have enough time to get to know a new set of customers in a month. 
In order to see how long it takes for a salesperson to get familiar with her new area, we 
check another definition of “new” loan officers. The variable 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟!" is defined as the 
dummy variable indicating that a salesperson j has been in the branch for less than two months as 
of the period o. In Table WA2, we find that at the acquisition stage, the effects of 𝐴!" and 𝐷!,!!! 
remain qualitatively consistent, but the Transfer effect becomes statistically insignificant. As we 
argued earlier, we believe that 2-months is already a very long time in this setting, considering 
the loan cycle and salespeople’s working hours. Thus, the new definition dilutes the effect of 
transfer policy that gets rid of private information from salespeople. 
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[Insert Table WA2 here] 
Table WA3 reports our analysis at the maintenance stage. The variable 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟!" is 
defined as the dummy variable indicating that a salesperson j has been in the branch for less than 
two months as of the period t. As in the main analysis in the paper, we find the negative 
coefficient of 𝐷!,!!!, implying the maintenance pressure ramps up monitoring intensity and 
reduces loan defaults among loans in good standing in the previous period (i.e. 𝐵𝑎𝑑!,!!! = 0). 
Also, the transferred salespeople do less effective monitoring, but the magnitude of the effect 
gets smaller. The coefficient of 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟!" in Table 5 is 0.00442, whereas the coefficient goes 
up to 0.00541 with the new definition.  All other coefficients remain qualitatively consistent with 
our main analysis documented in Table 5 in the paper. 
[Insert Table WA3 here] 
Analytical Model Under Additive Incentive Scheme 
 In our empirical context, the bank uses a multiplicative compensation scheme, where 
acquisition and maintenance performance indices are multiplied to compute bonuses. 
Accordingly, our hypotheses in the main paper were based on a model using a multiplicative 
compensation structure. We now assess whether our hypotheses will continue to hold an additive 
compensation scheme, by changing the compensation scheme in Section 3. 
 All assumptions and notation remain the same as in Section 3. The only change is that we 
the total bonus is now based on the sum of acquisition and maintenance performance. The 
salesperson maximizes the sum of the current period’s bonus and her loans’ continuation value, 
considering the acquisition and monitoring costs, as she does under the multiplicative incentive 
scheme. 
𝑈(𝛼! ,𝛼! ,𝑝) = (𝜆!𝛼! + 𝛼!)+ (ℎ + (1− ℎ − 𝑑)𝑝)−
𝑐




+[(𝜆!𝛼! + 𝑘ℎ)𝑉! + (𝛼! + 𝑘(1− ℎ − 𝑑)𝑝)𝑉!] 
s.t 0   ≤   𝛼! ,𝛼! ,𝑝   ≤   1 
We solve for the optimal solution of acquisition rate by type 𝛼!∗  and 𝛼!∗, and monitoring level for 
low type 𝑝∗. The solutions are provided below. 
𝑝∗ = (𝑚(1+ 𝑉!)− (1− ℎ − 𝑑)(𝑘𝑉! + 1))/(𝑐𝑚(𝑚 − 1)) 
𝛼!∗ + 𝛼!∗ = (𝑉!(𝑘 − 1)− (𝑘𝑉! + 1)(ℎ + 𝑑))/𝑐(𝑚 − 1) 
Both the hypotheses from the Analytical Model section, continue to remain valid.  
Details on Calculating Internal Rate of Return 
In this section, we explain how to calculate the internal rate of return (IRR), which is a key 
outcome variable in our main empirical analysis. The IRR of each loan is calculated based on 
loan size and returned amount over time. Our data do not include exact cash inflow; thus, we 
make the following assumption on the returned amount: a borrower decides to make zero 
repayment in the delinquent period and make full repayment in other periods. A loan officer 
cannot collect any amount from the period in which the loan defaults. IRR of loan i is defined as 
the rate that makes the loan’s NPV zero.  
 
Here, Cit is cash inflow in the period t (either full amount to be repaid, or zero amount), Cio 
is loan size, r is the interest rate and T is the number of time periods to be considered. If a 






Robustness Check - Endogeneity In Branches Where The Officers Are Transferred 
In the main paper, we demonstrate that the transfer was indeed random (Table 3). 
Nevertheless, even if the transfer policy is random, it may be possible that officers in under-
performing branches are more likely to be transferred to higher-performing branches or branches 
faced with better market conditions. If so, transferred officers may face a more profitable 
customer base in a new branch; thus, her new loans might perform better, and this may have 
nothing to do with the elimination of adverse selection due to private information. To address 
this concern, we include branch fixed effects and re-estimate coefficients in equations (1) and 
(2). 
Tables WA4 and WA5 show that our main results remain robust with branch fixed effects. 
Model 1 shows the estimates from Tables 4 and 5 in the main paper without branch fixed effects 
for comparison. For the acquisition stage regression reported in Table WA5, we continue to find 
evidence of adverse selection due to acquisition incentives and moderation of adverse selection 
due to maintenance incentives. The incentive states have smaller effect on IRR in Model 2 than 
in Model 1, since now the effect of branch-level market conditions (i.e., overall quality of 
customer base in a branch) on loan performance is controlled. Even including brand fixed 
effects, the coefficient of Transferjo remains positive, showing that transfers reduce adverse 
selection — transferred officers bring in higher quality loans than do continuing officers, even 
conditional on branch-level unobserved heterogeneity.  
     Table WA5 documents salespeople’s monitoring behavior within a branch. While the 
main loan default effects of incentives remain robust, the maintenance incentive effects are 
smaller with branch fixed effects, for both good and bad loans. In Model 2, the effect of transfer 
is insignificant for good loans, and slightly positive for bad loans, indicating that transferred 
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salespeople without private information are not very effective in monitoring existing loans, 
particularly bad loans. 
[Insert Tables WA4 and WA5 here] 
Robustness Check - Endogeneity in Loan Terms 
In our main specification, we treated loan terms as exogenous. A salesperson, however, may 
adjust loan terms (amount and maturity) using her private information. In order to address this 
concern, we redo the analysis, by using instruments for loan amount and loan duration to account 
for potential endogeneity. Recall that the interest rate is set by the bank as a function of the credit 
rating. 
We use the average loan characteristics of other loans acquired by the same loan officer j at 
period o as instruments for loan characteristics. Our rationale for the instruments is as follows: 
The average loan terms of a loan officer conditional on their observed loan rating in any given 
period reflect both the general style of the loan officer and his/her incentive based motivations in 
that period in offering loan terms. These factors are thus independent of any private information 
that the salesperson has on the customer and thus its impact on ex-post profitability and therefore 
is a valid instrument. Table WA6 shows that our instruments have sufficiently large F-values and 
are correlated with endogenous variables in the first stage. 
We report the results of the IRR regression with instruments in Table WA7. Interestingly, 
the effects of the main variables of interest, Acquisition, Maintenance and Transfers on IRR 
remain the same, but now the adverse selection effects have larger magnitudes and the 
maintenance pressure and transfer effects have smaller magnitudes. First, this shows that there is 
indeed endogeneity of loan terms. Further, it shows that the endogeneity of loan terms attenuate 
the effects of acquisition incentives and strengthens the effects of maintenance pressure and 
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transfers on IRR. Further, we find a reversal of signs for the terms loan amount and duration in 
Model 2. Specifically, we find that larger loans have lower IRR and larger duration loans have 
lower IRR. This suggests that salespeople offer larger loan amounts and longer duration loans to 
consumers about whom they have negative private information, conditional on other observed 
characteristics.  
[Insert Table WA7 here] 
We assess robustness based on an additional instrument for loan amounts and duration 
based on the loan amount and duration offered by the same salesperson to other customers with 
the same credit rating as the current customer. While this is more closely related as an instrument 
given that we additionally condition on customer observables, the challenge is that the number of 
such matched loans by customer types and salesperson tends to be often very few.  In our setting, 
there are about 42 loans on average served by the same officer in the same month, but only about 
24 loans on overage with the same credit rating and served by the same officer in the same 
month.  
Nevertheless, the results remain qualitatively robust as seen in Table WA8. The F-value 
confirms that the instruments work well. We still find the adverse selection when a salesperson 
acquires more customers, and is a continuing officer in the same branch. The effect of 
maintenance pressure (𝐷!,!!!) has the same positive sign, but becomes insignificant at the 10% 
significance level with the duration instrument. We partly attribute this finding to fewer matched 
cases.  





Robustness Check - Interaction between Incentive States and Transfer 
In the main text, we find evidence that transferred officers do not have private 
information and thus are less likely to engage in adverse selection. In other words, the adverse 
selection is expected to go down for transferred salespeople, if we include the interaction 
between Transfer dummy and Acquisition performance and observables. We report the results of 
such a specification in Table WA9. We find all main findings remain consistent: a salesperson 
engages in adverse selection due to acquisition incentive, the effect is moderated due to 
maintenance pressure, and the transfer to a new branch induces a salesperson to acquire higher 
quality borrowers. The positive coefficient of the interaction between acquisition incentive and 
transfer dummy tells us that the adverse selection due to acquisition incentive goes down for 
transferred salespeople. This is consistent with our theory and expectation that customer adverse 
selection will be greater for continuing salespeople who have more private information about 
customers.  
[Insert Table WA9 here] 
Robustness Check - Salesperson Learning 
We test additional specifications to rule out the explanation that a salesperson learns 
about how to increase IRR of customers over time in general. In Table WA10, we examine the 
effect of the dummy variable indicating the acquisition increases in column 1, and split the data 
based on whether the acquisition increases or not in columns 2 and 3. In Table WA11, the model 
controls for each salesperson’s tenure (i.e. years since he/she joined the institution). We still find 
that a salesperson is more likely to engage in adverse selection when her acquisition performance 
goes up, mainly when 𝐴!" is positive in column 2 of Table WA10. Other variables in interest 
show consistent results. The adverse selection is mitigated under higher maintenance pressure 
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and the transferred officers are more likely to accept safer loans. In Table WA11, the positive 
coefficient of Tenure variable shows that the experience at the bank helps the salesperson acquire 
better quality customers.  
[Insert Tables WA10 and WA11 here] 
Further, a salesperson might learn about customers in a particular region over time after moving 
to a new branch, and the increase in information affects loans’ profitability. We examine if any 
change in a salesperson’s private information about a region drives our qualitative result on IRR. 
We measure how many quarters have passed since transfer (i.e. since a salesperson started to 
work in a new branch) and interact the term with Incentive states, Transfer states and 
Salesperson fixed effects. In Table WA12, the most variables in interest are in effect. The table 
below shows that most variables in interest are still in effect. The first column interacts the 
quarter FE with Incentive states, the second column interacts the quarter FE with Incentives 
states and Transfer states, and the third column interacts the quarter FE with Salesperson FE to 
accommodate time-varying unobserved heterogeneity across salespeople. 
[Insert Table WA12 here] 
We interpret these results as follows. While is possible for a salesperson to improve his/her 
ability to increase IRR as they learn about a region (greater efficiency), private information can 
lead to losses in IRR as salesperson brings in easy to acquire low type consumers, conditional on 
observables. We define private information as any information about customer profitability 
beyond credit rating or the firm’s observables. If a salesperson learns about how to increase IRR 
of general customers or customers in a particular region, but still engages in adverse selection, it 




Acquisition Target Ratcheting 
In Table A.1 of the appendix, we describe how the bank sets its acquisition targets. As can 
be seen, in the quota schedule, a larger starting portfolio can lead to larger acquisition targets, 
with discrete jumps above discrete thresholds. One may wonder whether our results are robust to 
ratcheting effects.  
Observe that ratcheting incentives will not change our qualitative conclusions. The 
ratcheting effect leads to a perverse incentive for a salesperson who has just met current 
acquisition targets to not exceed the threshold, so as not to have a higher target the following 
month. This means that in the face of ratcheting incentives, adverse selection incentive is 
marginally mitigated. In other words, our measured estimate of adverse selection in response to 
acquisition incentives is a lower bound.  
Previous empirical literature on salesforce compensation has highlighted the adverse 
consequences of ratcheting incentive that induces workers to withhold effort to avoid larger 
future quotas (e.g., Anderson, Dekker and Sedatole 2010; Misra and Nair 2011). Our results shed 
new light on the another effect of ratcheting by alleviating customer adverse selection; 
disciplining salespeople to avoid the abuse of asymmetric information for short-term 
compensation at the expense of the firm. This effect may be a rationale for the use of target in 
practice (e.g., Leone and Rock 2002; Weitzman 1980). 
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Table WA1. Randomness of Transfer Policy 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 




Time since Last Transfer -0.0116  (0.0146)  
𝑀!!! * Time since Last Transfer 
0.0157  
(0.0159  
Average Loan Amount  0.0384 
 (0.0357) 
Intercept 0.0405 -0.0122 (0.0716) (0.0164) 
Period FE Yes Yes 
N 659 3,448 






Table WA2. Internal Rate of Return (IRR) of Newly Originated Loans with a new definition of 












Intercept -9.196*** (1.227) 
Loan 
Characteristics Yes 
Salesperson, Period FE Yes 
N 89,993 






Table WA3. Delinquency of Existing Loans with a new definition of the Transfer dummy 
 











𝐵𝑎𝑑!,!!! ∗ 𝐷!,!!! 
0.0943*** 
(0.0128) 












Loan Characteristics Yes 
Salesperson, Period FE Yes 
N 278,943 






Table WA4: IRR of New Loans with Branch FE 
 
 Model 1* Model 2 










Rating 2 3.991*** 3.863*** (0.598) (0.609) 
Rating 3 13.33*** 13.02*** (0.476) (0.484) 
Rating 4 21.74*** 21.23*** (0.420) (0.427) 
Rating 5 26.66*** 26.09*** (0.404) (0.411) 
Loan Amount 0.630*** 0.619*** (0.0790) (0.0800) 
Duration -0.108*** -0.0923*** (0.0202) (0.0205) 
Interest Rate 0.657*** 0.662*** (0.00703) (0.00711) 
Intercept -10.95*** -8.615*** (1.231) (2.593) 
Salesperson FE Yes Yes 
Period FE Yes Yes 
Branch FE No Yes 
N 89,993 86,886 
***: p<0.01, **: p<0.05, *: p<0.1  







Table WA5: Delinquency of Existing Loans with Branch FE 
 
 Model 1* Model 2 










𝐵𝑎𝑑!,!!! ∗ 𝐷!,!!! 
0.0957*** 0.0888*** 
(0.0128) (0.0132) 




𝐵𝑎𝑑!,!!! ∗ 𝐴!" 
0.000994 0.00288 
(0.00321) (0.00334) 
Rating 2 -0.00468 -0.00554 (0.00415) (0.00418) 
Rating 3 -0.0720*** -0.0730*** (0.00351) (0.00354) 
Rating 4 -0.165*** -0.166*** (0.00315) (0.00317) 
Rating 5 -0.253*** -0.255*** (0.00301) (0.00303) 
Loan Amount -0.00483*** -0.00478*** (0.000718) (0.000725) 
Duration 0.00163*** 0.00159*** (0.000180) (0.000181) 
Interest Rate 0.00212*** 0.00213*** (0.0000686) (0.0000692) 
Age of Loan 0.0113*** 0.0111*** (0.000299) (0.000301) 
Intercept 0.126*** 0.181*** (0.0112) (0.0509) 
Salesperson, Period FE Yes Yes 
Branch FE No Yes 
N 278,943 274,907 
***: p<0.01, **: p<0.05, *: p<0.1 





Table WA6: Instrumental Variable Regression - First Stage 
 










Loan Amount 0.27*** 1.86*** (0.012) (0.011) 
Duration 0.12*** 0.144*** (0.00075) (0.012) 
Intercept 0.051 4.10*** (0.033) (0.213) 
Loan 





F-value 1474.87 130.78 
N 89,860 89,860 





Table WA7. IRR of Newly Originated Loans with Instrumental Variables  
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
















Rating 2 3.990*** 5.473*** (0.670) (0.735) 
Rating 3 13.27*** 18.48*** (0.719) (1.445) 
Rating 4 21.6*** 29.81*** (0.779) (2.191) 
Rating 5 26.5*** 34.83*** (0.816) (2.213) 
Loan Amount 1.136 -2.962*** (1.038) (0.967) 
Duration -0.179 1.820*** (0.127) (0.518) 
Interest Rate 0.652*** 0.598*** (0.0133) (0.0176) 





N 89,860 89,860 







Table WA8. IRR of Newly Originated Loans with new Instrumental Variables 
 
















Intercept -17.65*** -23.96*** (1.865) (1.842) 
Loan 






value 78.11 127.45 
N 89,860 89,860 






Table WA9. IRR of New Loans with Interaction between Transfer and Incentive States 
 














Intercept -13.91*** (1.267) 
Loan Characteristics and 
Interactions with 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟!" 
Yes 
Salesperson, Period FE Yes 
N 89,993 





Table WA10. IRR of Newly Originated Loans (Learning) 
 
DV IRR IRR IRR 
  Positive 𝐴!" Negative 𝐴!" 
𝐴!" 
 -1.285** 0.287 
 (0.544) (0.334) 
Positive 𝐴!"   
-0.514***   
(0.134)   
𝐷!,!!! 
1.076** 1.936** 1.029* 
(0.537) (0.810) (0.557) 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟!" 
1.99*** 3.018*** 1.554*** 
(0.216) (0.352) (0.293) 
Intercept -10.60*** -9.56*** -10.96*** (1.231) (1.851) (1.637) 
Loan 
Characteristics Yes Yes Yes 
Salesperson FE 
Period FE 
Yes Yes No 
Yes Yes No 
N 89,993 49,489 40,504 


















Tenure 22.50*** (0.362) 














Table WA12. IRR of Newly Originated Loans (Learning about a region) 
 
DV IRR IRR IRR 
𝐴!" 
-0.321 -0.323 -0.295* 
(0.255) (0.255) (0.173) 
𝐴!"* (Quarter = 2) 
-0.684* -0.574  
(0.404) (0.407)  
𝐴!"* (Quarter > 2) 
-0.107 -0.0920  
(0.338) (0.339)  
𝐷!,!!! 
3.439*** 3.391*** 0.986 
(0.880) (0.880) (0.638) 
𝐷!,!!!* (Quarter = 2) 
-4.799*** -4.766***  
(1.459) (1.460)  
𝐷!,!!!* (Quarter > 2) 
-3.204** -3.219**  
(1.311) (1.311)  
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟!" 
2.025*** 3.157*** 2.328*** 
(0.217) (0.580) (0.243) 
(𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟!"= 0) * 
(Quarter = 2) 
 1.061***  
 (0.234)  
(𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟!"= 0) * 
(Quarter > 2) 
 1.234***  
 (0.231)  
(𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟!"= 1) * 
(Quarter = 2) 
 -0.518  
 (0.579)  
(𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟!"= 1) * 
(Quarter > 2) 
 -0.791  
 (1.064)  
Intercept -11.06*** -11.84*** -13.53*** (1.233) (1.242) (2.464) 
Loan Characteristics Yes Yes Yes 
Salesperson FE 
Period FE 
Yes Yes No 
Yes Yes No 
Salesperson FE * 
Quarter FE No No Yes 
N 89,993 89,993 89,993 
***: p<0.01, **: p<0.05, *: p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
